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PRESUPPOSING CORRUPTION:ACCESS,
INFLUENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE
PAY-TO-PLAY LEGAL FRAMEWORK
ALLISON C. DAVIS
ABSTRACT
Political spending, in all of its various permutations, lies at the
nexus between campaign finance law and pay-to-play law. Both
of these legal doctrines seek to minimize the corrupting effects of
money upon elected officials and candidates, and both impose
various caps and restrictions on political contributions in order
to do so. Over the past half-century, however, the Supreme Court
has struggled to define what sort of activity constitutes corruption
in the political sphere. In light of its decisions in 2010s Citizens
United v. FEC and 2014s McCutcheon v. FECtwo seminal cases
that dramatically altered campaign finance regulationthe
Court now appears to recognize that the act of gaining access to
elected officials via political spending does not constitute quid
pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof. This view has led to
deregulation of the legal framework of campaign finance in recent
years. Furthermore, at present, presupposing corruption on the part
of elected officials or candidates is not always a lawful assumption
upon which laws or regulations governing political spending can
be based. It thus follows that the corruption-based rationale at
the heart of certain federal, state, and local pay-to-play laws may
also be subject to challenge. This Note examines the Courts shifting views on corruption, applies it to various pay-to-play laws
Theauthorisa J.D. Candidateand Graduate Fellow in Election Law at
William & Mary Law School. She wishes to thank the editorialboard and
staffoftheWilliam & Mary Business Law Review;ProfessorsRebecca Green
and Darian Ibrahim fortheiradviceand assistancein reviewingearly drafts;
Joshua Rosenstein, whoseAdvocacy Regulation courseled totheidea forthis
Note;and Jason Torchinsky, Stefan Passantino, Kenneth Gross, and Patricia
Zweibel, whose collective knowledge and expertise practicing in this area of
the law is unsurpassed. The author is indebted to allofthe above for their
generosityand willingnesstoprovideguidanceand insight.
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currently in effect, and ultimately concludes that the legal and
constitutional framework for much of pay-to-play law, as it
currently stands, rests on shaky ground.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between cam paign finance law and pay-toplay law two legaldoctrines thatcam e into existence in only the
past half-century is com plicated, contested, and changing. Generally, each field is governed by a differentsetofstatutes and
regulations, butthese two areas ofjurisprudence are nevertheless intertwined. Both em ploy restrictions on politicalcontributionsin an attem ptto m inim ize corruption between, respectively,
donors and elected officials or candidates, or governm ent contractorsorbiddersand governm entofficials.
In addition, pay-to-play laws take m any oftheir cues from
cam paign finance law by em ploying the latter
sm ethodsofregulation, including im posing individualand aggregate lim its on
contributionsand m andating disclosure. Accordingly, precedent
setforth by litigation related to cam paign finance often has an
im pacton thelegitim acyandconstitutionalityofpay-to-playlaws.
Overthe pastseveralyears, our nation
s highestcourtdrastically changed the way in which itdefines politicalcorruption
orthe appearance thereof. Fordecades, the Suprem e Courtadhered tothe standard itsetforth in Buckley v. Valeo, a sem inal
cam paign finance case that, inter alia, distinguished between
politicalcontributions and expenditures in the regulatory context.1 Becausedirectcontributionstoelected officialsand candidatesforofficewerethoughttoposethedangerofcorruption via
quid pro quo exchanges, the governm enthad a very com pelling
interestin lim iting them , and courts could apply interm ediate
rather than strict scrutiny to laws thatlim ited contributions.2
Meanwhile, the Courtdeem ed thatlawscontrolling expenditures
by candidatesorcom m itteesm erited strictscrutiny and did not
im pose the risk ofcorruption, butthe Courtdeclined to rule on
whethercorporationscould m akethem .3 Nearlythirty-fiveyears
afterBuckley (and followinga longlineofcasesdebatingthelawfulness ofcorporate politicalexpenditures4), the Court held in
See generally 424U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at16.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Fi
rstNat
lBank ofBos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)(holding that
astatestatutebanningexpendituresbycorporationson ballotm easureelections
1
2
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Citizens United v. FEC thatunlim ited independentexpenditures
in support ofofficials and candidates are a form ofprotected
speech thatdo notgive rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.5 Two m onths later, the United States CourtofAppealsfortheD.C. Circuitheld in Speechnow.org v. FEC thatthe
governm entlacked a com pelling anti-corruption interestin lim iting contributionsto independentexpendituregroups.6 Finally,
fouryearsafterCitizens United, theCourtruled in favorofelim inating aggregate lim its (those it had affirm ed in Buckley)on
politicalcontributions in McCutcheon v. FEC, pronouncing that
the governm ent m ay only target quid pro quo corruption (the
directexchange ofan officialactor prom ise for rem uneration)
when regulatingin thecam paign financespace.7 Additionally, in
McCutcheon, the Courtheld thataccesstoelected officialsresulting from politicalcontributionsdoesnotconstitute quid proquo
corruption ortheappearancethereof.8
These decisions, and their progression toward a narrower
view ofwhatconstitutespoliticalcorruption, posequestionsabout
whetheram eaningfulFirstAm endm entdistinction existsbetween
aggregatelim itson politicalcontributionsin generaland lim itson
contributionssetforth asacondition ofeligibilityforagovernm ent
contract, which m any pay-to-play lawsim pose.9 Furtherm ore, if
wasunconstitutional);FEC v. Mass. CitizensforLife, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 239
(1986)(holding thatcorporationsthatexistforthe purpose ofdissem inating
inform ation, ratherthan turning a profit, areexem ptfrom theprohibition on
corporate expenditures in candidate elections);Austin v. Mich. Cham ber of
Com m erce, 494 U.S. 652, 65455 (1990) (holding that corporations m ay not
m akeindependentexpendituresin connection with statecandidateelections).
5 558 U.S. 310, 314(
2010).
6 599 F.3d 686, 69495 (
2010).
7 134 S. Ct
. 1434, 1441 (2014)(Any regulation m ustinstead targetwhatwe
havecalled 
quid pro quocorruption oritsappearance.).
8 Id. at1438 (
Spending large sum sofm oney in connection with elections,
butnotin connection with an efforttocontrolthe exercise ofan officeholder
s
officialduties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the
possibility that an individualwho spends large sum s m ay garner 
influence
overoraccesstoelected officialsorpoliticalparties.).
9 See, e.g., Rebec
ca MollFreed, McCutcheon v. FEC: the Potential Impact on
Aggregate Contribution Limits Under Local Pay-to-Play Ordinances, CORP.
POLITICAL ACTIVITY BLOG (Oct. 17, 2013), http:/
/www.corporatepoliticalactivity
law.com /new_jersey/m ccutcheon-v-fec-potential-im pact-aggregate-contribution
-lim its-local-pay-play-ordinances [http://perm a.cc/M6MR-8ZNB] (speculating
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increased accesstopublicofficialsisnolongerconsidered a form
ofcorruption, the rationale form any pay-to-play lawsm ay rest
on shakyground.
ThisNoteaddresseswhethertheshiftingstandardsforpolitical corruption em bodied by the Suprem e Court
s holdings in
Citizens United, McCutcheon, and otherrecentcasescould lead
to a challenge ofpay-to-play laws thatseek to preventthe appearance of im propriety via restrictions on political contributions, and arguesthatsuch a challenge m ay wellbe successful.
Additionally, current jurisprudence raises red flags and sets
clear lim its for regulators seeking to prom ulgate pay-to-play restrictions, and m any pay-to-play laws in effect today are not
properlytailored tothecauseofpreventingquid proquocorruption or the appearance thereof. This Note exam ines provisions
included in the two m ost prom inent federalpay-to-play laws
SEC Rule 206(4)-5 and MSRB Rule G-3710 as well as provisions in the nation
s stricteststatepay-to-play laws(in effectin
Connecticutand New Jersey)and new laws proposed by other
governm ent regulatory bodies, such as the Financial Industry
RegulatoryAuthority(FINRA). Although certain aspectsofthese
laws are properly tailored to the goalofpreventing corruption
and thus m ay ultim ately survive judicialreview, notallprovisionscontained therein m eetthestandardssetforth by current
jurisprudence. Hence, atboth thestateand federallevels, these
lawsm aybesubjecttosuccessfulchallenges.
PartI addresseshow theSuprem eCourthasprogressed over
theyearsin definingcorruption in thecontextofcam paign finance
regulation. PartII reviews the genesis and evolution ofpay-toplay laws atthe state and federallevel. PartIII exam ines the
FirstAm endm entproblem s posed by pay-to-play laws. PartIV
discussesadditionalproblem sposed bycurrentpay-to-playlaws.
Finally, PartV focuses on the issues thatthese laws m ay pose
forcontributorsand candidatesin futureelections.
that the McCutcheon decision could be extended to state pay-to-play laws
thatim poseaggregatecontribution lim its).
10 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(
4)-5 (2015);MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
RULE G-37: POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL
SECURITIES BUSINESS, http://www.m srb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB
-Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx[http://perm a.cc/3NK6-MUV9].
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, CORRUPTION, AND REGULATION OF
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Since its origins in the 1970s, cam paign finance law has
fram ed politicalspending in term softhe FirstAm endm ent:such
activityisconsidered corepoliticalspeech thatisessentialtothe
properfunctioning ofdem ocracy.11 The Suprem e Courthas applied two different levels ofscrutiny in m ost m ajor cam paign
finance cases:strict and interm ediate. Ifthe Court chooses to
review a law orregulation centered on independentpoliticalexpenditures, itm ustapply thehigherstandard ofstrictscrutiny,
which requires that the law be narrowly tailored in the least
restrictive m anner possible to advance a com pelling governm entinterest, with the goalofsafeguarding protected speech.12
Ifthe issue before the Courtinvolves certain types ofcontribution lim its, however, theCourtm ustapplythelowerstandard of
interm ediatescrutiny, which only requiresa finding thatthelaw
furthersasufficientlyim portantgovernm entinterestbyem ploying m eans closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgem ent of
associationalfreedom s.13
Itis notalways clearwhich levelofscrutiny a courtshould
apply in cam paign finance cases. As politicalcam paign infrastructuresgrow m orecom plex, itbecom esm oredifficulttoclassify
politicalspending as either a com pletely independentexpenditureora sim plecontribution. Asa result, in theyearsfollowing
the passage of the Federal Election Cam paign Act (FECA),
courtsareobligated toclarify whatlevelofscrutiny appliesin a
given case, aswellaswhich form sofallegedcorruption constitute
a com pelling state interestforthe purpose ofregulating m oney
in politics.14
11 Buckl
ey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976)([T]his Court has never suggested thatthedependenceofa com m unication on theexpenditureofm oney
operates itselfto introduce a nonspeech elem entor to reduce the exacting
scrutiny required by theFirstAm endm ent.).
12 See generally Ward v. Rock Agai
nstRacism , 491 U.S. 781 (1989);see
also United Statesv. O
Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
13 See, e.g., McCut
cheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444;see also Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov
tPAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000).
14 52 U.S.C. §30116 (
2015).
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A. The Beginning: Buckleyv. Valeoand Austin v. Michigan
Cham berofCom m erce
Asinitiallypassed in 1971, theFECA capped both individual
and aggregate politicalcontributions, aswellasthe expenditures
thatcould be m ade by candidates and candidate com m ittees.15
Shortly after its passage, however, the Courtstruck down the
FECA
s expenditure lim its in Buckley v. Valeo, holding thatthe
governm ent
s com pelling interestin preventing corruption orits
appearancewaslim ited to politicalcontributions. Contributions
were targeted because ofthe perceived danger ofquid pro quo
exchanges between contributors and candidates or elected officials a risk thatdid notexistin the contextofexpenditures.16
Ultim ately, theCourtin Buckley provided thatcorruption orthe
appearancethereofcould betargeted forregulation.17 Moreover,
theCourtheld thatgovernm entallim itation ofcontributionsboth
attheindividualand theaggregatelevelwasa narrowly tailored
approach towardpreventingsuch corruption.18
A decade and a halflater, the Suprem e Courtappeared to
expand on the definition ofcorruption set forth in Buckley in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. In Austin, Justice
Thurgood Marshallwroteforthem ajority, holding thatMichigan
s
ban on independentexpendituresin stateelectionsbycorporations
wasnarrowlytailored tothegoalofpreventingtheappearanceof
quid pro quo corruption, even though such expenditurescould
notbecoordinated with a candidateora candidatecom m ittee.19
Thus, atthe tim e, although independent expenditures unlike
contributions could ostensibly be m ade withoutthe knowledge
orconsentofacandidate, them erefactthattheycouldsupportor
opposethatcandidatewasenough ofa connection toposea risk
ofquidproquocorruption.20
Id.
Buckley, 424U.S. at45, 80.
17 Id. at13132.
18 Id. at26 (
Itis unnecessary to look beyond the Act
sprim ary purpose
to lim it the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
individualfinancialcontributions in orderto find a constitutionally sufficient
justification forthe$1,000 contribution lim itation.).
19 Aust
in v. Mich. Cham berofCom m erce, 494U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
20 See id. at66869.
15
16
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B. The Modern Era: CitizensUnited v. FEC and McCutcheon
v. FEC
From the beginning, the Roberts Court
s approach to previous
corruption jurisprudence wasm uch m ore skepticalthan thatof
Courts past. As a result, the Courtdrew attention to problem s
with thedefinition ofcorruption asitstood afterAustin. AsChief
Justice Robertshim selfnoted in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v.
FEC, a regulatory regim e directed at ever-expanding views of
whatconstituted corruption led to the application ofprophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis in a never-ending cam paign against circum vention.21 Such aregim ewasboundtofacestiffchallenges.
Thefirstm ajorsalvoagainstthem oreinclusiveBuckley and
Austin standard forcorruption arrived with the Suprem eCourt
s
rulingin Citizens United, which struck down thefederalprohibition on independentpoliticalexpenditures, thesam eprohibition
thatthe Courtpreviously found constitutionalin Austin.22 Citizens United did notaddressdirectcontributionstocandidates, but
thecasedid addresswhetherindependentpoliticalexpenditures
(which, incidentally, could be m ade by corporationswith contract
businessbefore the governm ent)could lead to corruption orthe
appearance thereof. During oralargum ents, the FEC stipulated
thatthe very prem ise ofthe independentexpenditure prohibition
wasto preventindividualsorcorporationsfrom spending m assive
am ounts ofm oneyon cam paign advertisem entsthatcould possibly have an electoraleffectand lead, in turn, to favor-seeking
between such entitiesand the candidatesthey support.23 In the
opinion, however, JusticeAnthonyKennedyapplied strictscrutiny
and held thatincreased accessresulting from independentexpenditureswasnotindicativeofcorruption, and although speakers
m ay haveinfluenceoveroraccesstoelected officials[, that]does
notm ean thatthose officialsare corrupt.24
Kennedy
s opinion in Citizens United, which took key cues
from his priordissentin McConnell v. FEC,25 signaled a break
551 U.S. 449, 479 (2007).
CitizensUnited v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010).
23 Transcri
ptofOralArgum entat47, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2009)(No. 08-205).
24 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at314.
25 
[Congress m ay]regulat[e]federalcandidatesand officeholdersreceipt
ofquids [butitm ay not]regulat[e]... any conductthatwinsgoodwillfrom or
21
22
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with the Court
s prior views aboutwhatactionsand eventsconstitute corruption. By indicating thatincreasing one
s access or
influencetopublicofficialsisnotacorruptact, theCourtdealta
heavyblow totheconceptthatthegovernm enthasa com pelling
interest in regulating what it perceives as corruption absent
actualevidence ofwrongdoing. Furtherm ore, in dicta, Justice
Kennedy cast doubt on whether gaining access through independentexpenditures even bore the aura ofcorruption, stating
that the appearance of influence or access willnot cause the
electorate to lose faith in thisdem ocracy.26
Kennedy
sopinion setthe stage forMcCutcheon, in which the
Courtrem oved certain restrictionson directcontributions, rather
than independent expenditures.27 Although the ruling in
McCutcheon dealt narrowly with aggregate contribution lim its
and didnotdirectlyaddresspay-to-playrestrictions, thereasoning
thattheCourtem ployed in reaching itsholding hasthepotential
tothreaten theconstitutionalbasisform anypay-to-playlaws.
In McCutcheon, the Courtexam ined whetheraggregate lim its
on politicalcontributions, which weresetat$123,200 overallfor
the 20132014 election cycle,28 could withstand interm ediatescrutiny, and held thatthey could not.29 In a pluralityopinion, Chief
JusticeJohn Robertswrotethatlawsthatarenotproperly drawn
topreventquid proquocorruption ortheappearancethereofcan
and should be trum ped by theFirstAm endm ent, and lawsthat
attem ptto preventingratiation and access between candidates
and their donors, rather than de facto corruption, do not fall
under this rubric.30 The Court reasoned that the potentialfor
influencesa Mem berofCongress.McConnellv. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 294 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
26 Id.
27 See generally McCut
cheon v. FEC, 134S. Ct. 1434(2014).
28 COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, THE FEC INCREASES INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR 20132014 (
Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.cov.com /files/Publi
cation/0fc16100-f79c-4222-8686-00e70bc91845/Presentation/PublicationAttach
m ent/7309c948-e64d-4268-82ed-104ad7e1fe45/The_FEC_Increases_Individual
_Contribution_Lim its_for_2013-2014.pdf[http:
//perm a.cc/V4VU-TVB5](explaining the increased lim its on individualcontributions for the 20132014 election
cycle).
29 See generally McCutcheon, 134S. Ct
. at1434.
30 Id. at1441 (
We have said thatgovernm entregulation m ay nottarget
the generalgratitude a candidate m ay feeltoward thosewhosupporthim or
hisallies, orthe politicalaccesssuch supportm ay afford.).
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corruption doesnotincreasewhen a donorcan givethesam econtribution, subjectto the individuallim its, to m ore candidatesor
com m ittees than was perm itted under the aggregate lim it.31
Therefore, afterapplying interm ediate scrutiny, the Courtheld
that the aggregate lim its were not sufficiently drawn toward
preventingquid proquocorruption ortheappearancethereof.32 In
essence, FirstAm endm entrightsareparam ount, and m orespeech,
notlessis the governing rule forcam paign finance regulation,
unlessthegovernm entcanshow thatacontributionisquidproquo.
ThereasoningthattheSuprem eCourtem ployedin McCutcheon
can alsobefound in Dallman v. Ritter, a 2010 casein which the
Colorado Suprem e Court struck down Am endm ent 54 to the
Colorado Constitution.33 The am endm entprohibited sole source
governm entcontractors and m em bers oftheirim m ediate fam iliesfrom m akingcontributionstopoliticalpartiesortostateand
localcandidates during the duration ofa governm entcontract
and for two years after its conclusion.34 The language of the
am endm ent referred to a presum ption ofim propriety between
contributionsto any cam paign and sole source governm entcontracts.35 In otherwords, Am endm ent54presupposed corruption
ortheappearancethereof. Thecourtheld thatalthough preventing theactuality and appearance ofcorruption wasa justifiable
governm entinterest, the appearance ofcorruption alone is not
sufficienttojustify any and allrestrictionson FirstAm endm ent
freedom s,and the far-reaching and vague language in Am endm ent54 wasnotproperly drawn to the goalofpreventing such
corruption.36 AstheSuprem eCourtopined laterin McCutcheon,
Id. at1463:
Equally unpersuasive is Buckleys suggestion that contribution lim itswarrantlessstringentreview because 
[t]he quantity
of com m unication by the contributor does not increase
perceptibly with the size ofhis contribution,and 
[a]t m ost,
thesizeofthecontribution providesa very rough index ofthe
intensity ofthecontributor
ssupportforthecandidate.
32 Id. at 1449 (
To require one person to contribute at lower levels than
othersbecausehewantstosupportm orecandidatesorcausesistoim posea
specialburden on broaderparticipation in thedem ocraticprocess.).
33 225 P.3d 610, 640 (
Colo. 2010).
34 COLO. CONST. art
. XXVIII, § 15 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2014
am endm ents).
35 Dallman, 225 P.3d at615.
36 Id. at623.
31
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theColoradocourtalsofound thattherewaslittleevidenceshowing thatthe prohibition on contributionsreduced actualcorruption, and correspondingly, such prohibitions overburdened the
FirstAm endm entrightsofthosetargeted byAm endm ent54.37
C. The Appearance of Impropriety and the Coming Debate
Them ostrecentcaseem bodyingtheidea thattheappearance
ofcorruption itselfis a com pelling governm entinterestarrived
in 201415, when the D.C. CircuitCourtofAppeals adjudicated
Wagner v. FEC. In Wagner, theplaintiffssoughttochallengethe
constitutionality ofthe FECA
s prohibition against federalgovernm entcontractorcontributionsin connection with federalelections.38 This prohibition is som ewhat narrowly drawn;it only
lim its naturalpersons who are federalgovernm entcontractors
from m aking politicalcontributionsand doesnotinclude fam ily
m em bers.39 The plaintiffs in Wagner argued thatthis law was
overbroad because itbanned contributionsby a classofindividualcitizenswho are atlow risk forcorruption those who do not
win governm entcontracts through a bidding process and thus,
theFEC failed toestablish thatthelaw isappropriatelytailored
tothespecificgoalofpreventingcorruption.40 Wagner, likeother
cam paign finance cases, involved a traditional analysis that
weighsspeech via contributionsagainsttherisk ofquid proquo
corruption ortheappearancethereof.41 In thelead-up totheD.C.
Id. at633 (Theseattributesm akethepotentialofpay-to-playcorruption in
acollectivebargainingagreem entexceedinglyrem ote, sothegovernm entlacksa
sufficiently im portantinteresttojustifythissortofheavy-handed regulation.).
38 See generally Wagnerv. FEC, 854F. Supp. 2d 83 (
D.D.C. 2013), vacated,
717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013), appeal after remand, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2015)(en banc).
39 52 U.S.C. §30119 (
2015).
40 Com pl
aintat17, Wagnerv. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013)(No. 11cv-1841(JEB)):
Becausesection 441ccom pletely prohibitsindividualswith governm entcontractsfrom m akinganycontributionstocandidates,
politicalcom m ittees, and politicalparties in connection with
elections for federaloffices, it is unconstitutionalunder the
FirstAm endm entunless there isa com pelling governm ental
interestin theban and theban isnarrowlytailored tosupport
thatinterest.
41 Tel
ephone Interview with Kenneth Gross, Partner, & Patricia Zweibel,
Counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher& Flom LLP (Jan. 29, 2015).
37
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Circuit
s decision, various cam paign finance experts speculated
that the court would choose to take its cues from Dallman by
striking down the prohibition on contractorcontributionsasan
overzealous restriction of protected First Am endm ent speech,
enforced onlyagainstalim ited class:governm entcontractors.42
In a unanim ousopinion issued in July of2015, however, the
D.C. Circuitupheld the ban, reasoning thatthe potentialforcorruption thatoriginally spurred thelaw rem ained a pressing concern.43 The opinion engaged in an extensive historicalreview of
the problem s posed by politicalpressure vis-à-vis politicalcontributions and concluded thatpastincidents illustrated thata
ban on contractor contributions was necessary.44 Although the
courtnoted thatthe plaintiffs lim ited their claim to individual
contractorsand conceded thatm ostofitsanalysisinvolved corporate not individual m isdeeds, it extended the potentialfor
corruption and coercion to these individuals.45 This rationale
ostensibly rests upon the idea thatthe governm entinterestin
preventing the appearance ofim propriety in such situations is
based upon the sam e underlying principles as the 1939 Hatch
Act, which preventscertain governm entem ployeesfrom engaging in politicalcam paign activity.46 Upon closer exam ination,
however, the Wagner holding also seem ed to take m any ofits
cuesfrom theassertion thatthegovernm entm ay actaggressively
to preventthe m ere publicperception ofthe appearance ofcorruption.47 This line of reasoning seem s som ewhat unsupported
with respecttoSuprem eCourtprecedent, especiallyMcCutcheon.48
Notably, theWagner courtheld thattotalbanson politicalcontributions should be held to the sam e level of scrutiny interm ediate as m ere lim its on such contributions.49 This holding
TelephoneInterview with Stefan Passantino, Partner, McKennaLong&
Aldridge LLP (Jan. 15, 2015). Passantino characterizes the restriction as
creating a status crim e, in which m em bers ofa certain class (governm ent
contractors)areprohibited from engagingin otherwiseprotected speech.
43 Wagner, 793 F.3d at1718 (
D.C. Cir. 2015).
44 Id. at17 n.21.
45 Id. at28.
46 5 U.S.C. §7323 (
2015).
47 Wagner, 793 F.3d at1516.
48 See supra not
es3233 and accom panying text.
49 Id. at22.
42
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relied heavily upon the rationale setforth in FEC v. Beaumont,
a 2003 Suprem eCourtcasethatupheld an outrightban on corporate politicalcontributions by applying interm ediate rather
than strict scrutiny.50 Since2003, however, Beaumont
srationale
hasnotsurvived unscathed. Both Citizens United and Speechnow
disavowed a hefty portion ofBeaumont
s reasoning with respect
to corporate politicalspending, and McCutcheon further tightened thegap between thecom pelling publicinteresta cam paign
financelaw isintended touphold and therestrictionsitim poses
on protected speech.51 TheWagner courtrelied heavilyupon case
law thatisquestionably relevantin thecurrentera ofcam paign
finance, and although the U.S. Suprem e Courtdenied the plaintiffspetition fora writofcertiorariin January of2016, itsholding
in McCutcheon rem ainsatoddswith theD.C. Circuit
srationale
forupholdingthelaw. 52
Ultim ately, Citizens United, McCutcheon, and theirbrethren
have m oved toward a new doctrine:the governm entonly hasa
com pelling interestin preventing quid proquocorruption orthe
appearance thereof rather than the presupposition of corruption via restrictions on contributions, and access resulting
from contributions or expenditures does notconstitute corruption.53 In the wake of high-profile corruption cases involving
form erVirginia GovernorRobertMcDonnelland form erIllinois
Governor Rod Blagojevich, the Suprem e Courtm ay further develop thisposition, atleastwith regard to federalhonestservices
laws.54 In theMcDonnelland Blagojevich cases, theFourth and
Seventh Circuits affirm ed the respective trial courtsfindings
FEC v. Beaum ont, 539 U.S. 146, 16163 (2003).
See supra discussion in PartI.B.
52 Wagnerv. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (
D.C. Cir. 2015)(en banc), cert. denied sub
nom. Millerv. FEC (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016)(No. 15-428).
53 Ll
oyd HitoshiMayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Privacy, 62 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 801, 82324 (2012).
54 Kennet
h P. Doyle, McDonnell Case Could Shape Corruption Law,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.bloom berglaw.com /exp/eyJpZ
CI6IkEwSDVYOFA3VzU/anM9MCZzdWJzY3JpcHRpb250eXBlPWJuYWRlci
Zpc3N1ZT0yMDE1MTEzMCZjYW1wYWlnbj1ibm FlbWFpbGxpbm sm c2l0ZW
5hbWU9Ym 5hIiwiY3R4dCI6IkJCTkEiLCJ1dWlkIjoiOXBicCtCWXlTNm pDR
2p4TndTSm 15dz09UHVzZm gyU1M0SzRCTWhNUUZCUkFyQT09IiwidGltZ
SI6IjE0NDg2NzQ4NTQ5NzkiLCJzaWciOiJnZ2RVT09nWk5BS1dRY2VlaDZ
OODlESXhm TkU9IiwidiI6IjEifQ== [http://perm a.cc/U3PN-MX9C].
50
51
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that McDonnelland Blagojevich traded officialacts for rem uneration.55 Both governors subsequently filed separate petitions
for certiorariarguing thatthe actions they had taken were not
officialacts,butpedestrian politicalactivitiessuch asarranging
m eetingsand attending events.56 Although McDonnell
s case involved federalhonestserviceslawsratherthan cam paign finance
law (andtheFourth Circuitm adethisdistinction in itsholding57),
both casesm erittheattention ofpay-to-playandcam paign finance
lawyers, given theirfocus on an integralaspectofquid pro quo:
whatexactly constitutesan officialact.
TheCourt, however, hasnotforeclosed theidea thatthegovernm entstillhas an interestin preventing acts thatcarry the
m erewhiffofcorruption.58 Therefore, the governm entm ay seek
to regulate politicalm oney in other ways, such as com pelled
disclosureregim es. Thereasoning behind theim position ofsuch
regim es, set forth in Buckley, stillholds:disclosure serves to
detercorruption and facilitatestheenforcem entofotherelection
laws, and thenegativeconsequencesofdisclosureareoutweighed
byitsbenefits.59
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAY-TO-PLAY LAWS
Pay-to-play laws, like cam paign finance laws, originated in
the 1970s,60 butonly becam e com m on atthe state and federal
United Statesv. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 507511 (4th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3217 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016)(No. 15-474);United Statesv.
Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 73334 (7th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 84
U.S.L.W. 3304(U.S. Nov. 19, 2015)(No. 15-664).
56 Pet
ition forWritofCertiorariat12, McDonnell, 792 F.3d478 (No. 15-474);
Petition forWritofCertiorariat910, Blagojevich, 794F.3d729 (No. 15-664).
57 McDonnell, 792 F.3d at50405.
58 Mayer, supra not
e53.
59 Buckl
ey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68, 8182 (1976). Additionally, in Novem ber of2015, the United States Suprem e Courtdeclined to review California
s
§501(c)(3)disclosurerequirem ents, which had been upheldbytheNinth Circuit.
Ctr. forCom petitive Politicsv. Harris, No. 2:14-cv-00636-MCE-DAD, 2014 WL
2002244 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2014), affd, 784 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, No. 15-152, 2015 WL 4611242 (2015). Although Harris did notinvolve
electoralactivities, the Court
s decision not to grant certiorariin that case
could beviewed asabroaderendorsem entofm andatorydisclosure.
60 Crai
gHolm an & MichaelLewis, Pay-to-Play Laws in Public Contracting
and the Scandals that Created Them, PUB. CITIZEN, at4 (June26, 2012), http://
www.citizen.org/
docum ents/wagner-case-record.pdf[http:
/
/
perm a.cc/
XTS2-4YZV].
55
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levelsoverthe pasttwo decades.61 Many ofthese lawscoverall
individuals and entities engaged in business with the governm ent;othersdealsolely with certain sectors, such asm unicipal
securities dealers or investm ent advisers.62 Although various
jurisdictionsinitially proposed and passed these lawsin response
toconcernsaboutthelink between politicalcontributionsand the
procurem entprocessforlucrativegovernm entcontracts, pay-toplaylawsdonotexistforthepurposeofpreventingquid proquo
politicalcorruption, which isalready prohibited understateand
federalbribery statutes.63 Instead, becausequid proquocorruption in itsplainestform isso difficulttoprove, pay-to-play laws
aredesigned toquash theappearanceofcorruption orim propriety
that m ay result when individuals and entities engaged in the
procurem ent process m ake politicalcontributions to officials involvedin determ iningtherecipientsofgovernm entcontracts.64
A. Federal Laws
Theseedsofm odern federalpay-to-play lawsfirstgerm inated
in theearly1970s, afterthepressrevealed thatsittingVicePresidentSpiroAgnew received over$100,000 in cam paign giftsin exchangeforprom isestoinfluencetheawardingofstateand county
engineering contracts.65 Additionalscandalsfollowed in them id1970sand 1980s, when reportsofpay-to-play activity surfaced in
various states across the nation.66 Ultim ately, in Septem ber of
1993, representatives ofthe MunicipalSecurities Rulem aking
Board (MSRB)testified before Congress regarding the need for
regulation ofthem unicipalsecuritiesm arket. In thistestim ony,
the MSRB
s representatives expressed the need for a specific
Jason Abel, The Next Rule: Pay-to-Play, Municipal Advisors, and
McCutcheon, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (May 14, 2014), http://www.steptoe
.com /publications-9593.htm l[http://perm a.cc/TNF4-4MKM].
62 Id.
63 18 U.S.C. §201 (
2014).
64 St
efan Passantino, Did the US Supreme Courts Ruling in McCutcheon v.
FEC Put the Constitutionality of Some Pay-to-Play Laws in Doubt?, PAY TO PLAY
L. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.paytoplaylawblog.com /did-the-us-suprem e
-courts-ruling-in-m ccutcheon-v-fec-put-the-constitutionality-of-som e-pay-to-play
-laws-in-doubt[http://perm a.cc/GW69-9BK5].
65 Hol
m an & Lewis, supra note60.
66 Id.
61
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regulatory responseto concerns over the appearance ofim proprietythatcan occurwhen underwritersm akepoliticalcontributionsto officialswith whom they do business.67 Asa result, in
1994, the MSRB adopted Rule G-37, which prohibits covered
entities, such as brokers, dealers, m unicipalsecurities dealers,
and their politicalaction com m ittees (PACs), from engaging in
m unicipalsecurities business with governm ent issuers within
twoyearsafterthey contributem orethan a dem inim isam ount
toan officialem ployed bytheissuer.68
In theyearssince RuleG-37 took effect, regulatorshavem odeled subsequentrestrictionsupon theMSRB
sinitialrule. In 2011,
the Securitiesand Exchange Com m ission (SEC)prom ulgated the
Advisers ActRule 206(4)-5, which restricts the ability ofinvestm entadvisers and their corporate PACs to m ake politicalcontributionstocertain covered officials.69 Thelaw aim stoprevent
theselection ofinvestm entadviserstopublicpension fundsand
sim ilar entities by officials who receive contributions from certain em ployeesoftheadviser, aswellasadviser-controlledPACs.70
Moreover, itprovides for a two-year ban on advisers receiving
com pensation for services ifthe adviser or one ofits covered
associates m akes a non-exem ptcontribution to a publicofficial
or candidate with the ability to influence advisory business.71
This com pensation ban includes both investm ent m anagem ent
fees and carried interest, m eaning thatan investm entadviser
who violates the Rule could surrender m illions of dollars for
even a single non-exem ptpoliticalcontribution.72 Rule 206(4)-5
67 JoeMys
ak, State Treasurers Dredge Up Pay-to-Play Nightmare, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 26, 2003), http://www.bloom berg.com /apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=aFhQ6l4Jj_CE&refer=colum nist_m ysak [http://perm a.cc/XD5P-AL9C].
68 MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-37:POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND
PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL SECURITIES BUSINESS, http://www.m srb.org/Rules
-and-Interpretations/
MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx [http:/
/perm a.cc/
3NK6
-MUV9].
69 17 C.F.R. §275.206(
4)-5(a)(1)(2014).
70 Mel
anieWaddell, Fair Play: The Fight Over Rule 206(4)-5, INV. ADVISOR
(May 1, 2011), http://www.thinkadvisor.com /2011/05/01/fair-play-the-fight-over
-rule-20645?page=3 [http://perm a.cc/A6TE-YB4H].
71 17 C.F.R. §275.206(
4)-5(a)(1).
72 Pol
iticalContributions by Certain Investm ent Advisors, 75 Fed. Reg.
41018, 41048 (July 14, 2010)(to be codified at17 C.F.R. pt. 275)(the adviser
could instead com ply with the Rule by waiving orrebating the portion ofits
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im poses strictliability, and does notm ake exceptions forgoodfaith effortstocom ply;even asinglecontribution in violation ofthe
Rule could lead to a ban.73 Rule 206(4)-5
s expanded scope, as
wellasitsharsherpenalties, hasled practitionersofpoliticallaw
tocharacterizeitasrepresentinga drasticexpansion ofthepayto-play universe, with im plications above and beyond those of
previouslyprom ulgated laws.74
In Novem ber of2014, FINRA proposed another pay-to-play
law thatwouldrestricttheabilityofinvestm entadviserswhodoor
seek businesswith governm ententitiestom akepoliticalcontributions.75 Theproposed rulebuildsupon Rule206(4)-5 bynotonly
prohibiting the receiptofcom pensation foradvisory servicesby
violators, butalso by m andating disgorgem entofany profits receivedunderarelationshipdeem edtobeaviolation oftheRule.76
B. State Laws
Many states and localities have enacted their own pay-toplay lawsin responsetoscandalsinvolving governm entcontractorsand influentialstate officials.77 Aswith federalpay-to-play
laws, the ultim ate goalofstate pay-to-play laws isto m aintain
the integrity ofgovernm entcontractproceedings by preventing
theappearanceofa system thatobligatespoliticalcontributions
from contract bidders that want to secure business from the
governm ent.78 However, these laws vary dram atically in term s
feesorany perform anceallocation orcarried interest);see also Waddell, supra
note70.
73 Jason Abel
, A New Era for Pay-to-Play, ELECTION L. BLOG (June23, 2014,
3:55 PM), http:/
/electionlawblog.org/
?p=62666 [http:
//
perm a.cc/MXW6-CYMZ].
74 Tel
ephoneInterview withKennethGross& PatriciaZweibel, supra note41.
75 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REG. NOTICE 14-50, POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS:FINRA REQUESTS COMMENT ON A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A PAY-TOPLAY RULE (Nov. 2014), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc
_file_ref/14-50.pdf[http://perm a.cc/C5R9-BVL7].
76 Id. at7.
77 Not
able incidents involved, separately, form er Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich, form er Connecticut Governor John Rowland, and form er California Public Em ployees Retirem ent System (CalPERS) board m em ber Al
Villalobos. See Holm an & Lewis, supra note 60, at 1213 (referring to Connecticut, Illinois, and New York pay-to-playscandals).
78 See, e.g., Kar
lJ. Sandstrom & MichaelT. Liburdi, Overview of State Pay-toPlay Statutes, PERKINS COIE LLP (May 5, 2010), http://www.perkinscoie.com
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ofwhom they coverand how thoseindividualsorbusinessesare
restricted. Som e pay-to-play lawsprovide forcontribution restrictionson contractorPACs,79 aswellasthespouses, partners, and
dependentchildren ofcovered individuals.80 Som eapply tostate
party com m ittees, aswellasindividualcandidate com m ittees.81
Som e apply only to sole source orno-bid contracts, while others
applytocom petitive-bid contractsaswell.82
Asdetailed in PartIV, Section B, Connecticuthasoneofthe
nation
s strictest state pay-to-play laws, which was enacted in
thewakeofa publiccorruption scandalthatultim ately led tothe
conviction ofform er Governor John Rowland for conspiracy to
com m ithonestservices fraud.83 Under this law, state contractors, prospective state contractors, and theirprincipals seeking
state contracts of$50,000 or m ore are prohibited from contributing to or soliciting contributions on behalfofstate and local
officials, their exploratory com m ittees, or state party com m ittees.84 Principalsare broadly defined, and include m em bers of
the contractor
s board;individuals owning 5 percent or m ore of
the com pany
s stock;individuals living in Connecticutwho hold
/im ages/content/2/1/v2/21769/wp-10-05-pay-to-play.pdf [http://perm a.cc/L89L
-ULLH]([M]any jurisdictionshave enacted laws with the goalofnotonly
m aintaining theintegrity ofthecontracting process, butalsopreventing a de
facto regim e whereby bidders com e to believe that itis necessary to m ake
politicalcontributionsin orderto obtain governm entcontracts.).
79 See, e.g., CAL. GOV
T CODE §84308 (West2014)
;CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-612(f)(1)(F)(West 2014);N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A20.13 et seq. (West
2014)(coveringcontractorPACs).
80 Compare §9-612(
f)(1)(F)(coveringspousesanddependentchildren)with 30
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §500/50-37(a)(West2014)(coveringspousesalone).
81 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-612;W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12 (
West
2014)(covering state and localcandidatesand parties)with IND. CODE ANN.
§4-30-3-19.5 (West2014)(covering candidatesforstate office, party com m ittees, and caucuses).
82 Compare CAL. GOV
T CODE § 84308 (
no-bid only)with § 9-612 (both nobid and com petitivecontracts).
83 In Sept
em berof2014, form erGovernorRowland wasconvicted ofseven
countsofelection-related honestservicesfraud. See, e.g., Alison Leigh Cowan,
Rowland, Ex-Connecticut Governor, Is Convicted in Campaign Finance Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytim es.com /2014/09/20/nyregion/row
land-ex-connecticut-governor-found-guilty-of-corruption.htm l[http://perm a.cc
/5NC7-V9JK].
84 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §9-612(
f)(2)(A)(B)(West2014).
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the title of president, treasurer, or executive vice president;
spouses, partners, and dependentchildren oftheaforem entioned;
and politicalcom m itteesestablished by the contractororany of
theaforem entioned.85
New Jersey
s pay-to-play law, like Connecticut
s, was also
passed in responsetoa bribery scandal. Thescandalin question
involved a $392 m illion non-com petitive private contract that
was awarded to a com pany thatgave $507,950 to state candidates and com m ittees in the fouryears prior.86 The law, which
wascodified in 2004, prohibitsallbutde m inim iscontributions
togubernatorialcandidatesand stateand county party com m ittees by contractors;their PACs and subsidiaries;their officers;
the spouses, partners, and dependent children ofofficers;and
any person or entity thatcontrols m ore than 10 percentofthe
contractor.87 Additionally, New Jersey allowscounty and m unicipalgovernm entsto im pose additionalpay-to-play lawsasthey
see fit.88 This has resulted in a dense patchwork ofregulations
and disclosure requirem ents atboth the state and locallevels,
which hasprom pted observersto characterize New Jersey
s col89
lectivepay-to-playlawsasthetoughestin thenation.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Thekey differencebetween theaverageindividualwhoseeks
to m ake a politicalcontribution and a governm ent contractor
who seeks to do so involves the m atterofchoice in doing business. The Suprem e Courtaffirm ed in McCutcheon thatpolitical
contributions are a form ofspeech that can currently only be
abridged by individual candidate and com m ittee contribution
lim its.90 Hence, an individualcannotbe prevented from giving
Id. at(e)(1).
Francis E. Schiller& W. Cary Edwards, N.J. Enhanced Motor Vehicle
Inspection Contract 62, STATE OF N.J. COMM
N OF INVESTIGATION (
Mar. 2002),
http://www.state.nj.us/sci/pdf/
m vinspect.pdf[http:/
/perm a.cc/YW5C-A854].
87 N.J. STAT. ANN. 19:
44A-20.320.7 (West2014).
88 Id. at20.26.
89 Col
leen O
Dea, New Jersey: Best score in the country, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Mar. 19, 2012, 12:01 AM), http:/
/www.stateintegrity.org/
newjersey
_story_subpage[http://perm a.cc/252W-6EGR].
90 See generally McCut
cheon v. FEC, 134S. Ct. 1434(2014).
85
86
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up totheindividuallim ittoany num berofcandidatesand com m ittees.91 A governm ent contractor, however, presently has a
choice between engaging in businesswith the governm ent, which
subjects itto additionalrestrictions intended to ensure the integrity ofthe contracting process, and participating fully in the
electoralprocessviapoliticalcontributions.92
A. The Conditioning of Protected Speech
According to the governm entagenciesand state legislatures
that prom ulgate pay-to-play laws, lucrative governm ent contractsdonotcom ewithoutstringsattached, and contractorsare
freeto choose theirbusinessin ordertoavoid such conditions.93
Thefactthatcontractorsareengaged in, orareseeking toengage
in, a business relationship with the governm entadds an additionaldim ension to the relationship between donor and donee,
and potentially increasesthelikelihood thata contribution m ay
influencetheentitythatisawardingthecontract.
Atthefederallevel, thetwom ostextensivepay-to-play laws,
MSRB Rule G-37 and SEC Rule 206(4)-5, are sim ilarly structured:both rules contain a two-year restriction on covered advisersproviding certain typesofservicestoa governm ententity
following a politicalcontribution to certain governm entofficials
within that entity.94 However, Rule G-37 prohibits m unicipal
securities dealers from providing such services at all, regardless ofwhetherrem uneration isinvolved,95 while Rule 206(4)-5
prohibits SEC-registered advisers from providing such services
for compensation.96 Thereason forthisdistinction appearstolie
in the factthatthe m unicipalbond underwriting business(covered by the MSRB
s rule) is transaction-oriented, whereas the
investm entadvising business (covered by the FEC
s rule)relies
Id.
See, e.g., Waddell, supra note70.
93 See, e.g., Freed, supra not
e9.
94 MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-37:POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND
PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL SECURITIES BUSINESS, http://www.m srb.org/Rules
-and-Interpretations/
MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx [http:/
/perm a.cc/
3NK6
-MUV9];17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-5 (2014).
95 MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-37, supra not
e94.
96 17 C.F.R. §275.206(
4)-5(a)(1).
91
92
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on long-term business relationships between advisers and their
clients.97 Thus, becauseinvestm entadviserscovered underRule
206(4)-5 usually havean ongoing fiduciary duty to theirclients,
ifan adviserweretom akea contribution in violation oftheRule,
it could not sim ply dum p the client. Itcould, however, be required to provide its services for free during the period ofthe
two-yearban.98
1. MSRB Rule G-37
Although the D.C. Circuitupheld Rule G-37 as constitutional
in Blount v. SEC in 1995,99 this holding and the stipulation
thatentitiesand individualscovered underRuleG-37 areforced
to choose between exercising theirFirstAm endm entrightsand
engaging in custom ary business activities m ay no longerapply
in thewakeofm orerecentjurisprudence.
In Blount, thecourtapplied strictscrutiny and held thatthe
MSRB
srule wasnarrowly tailored toward addressing the appearance ofquid pro quo corruption.100 In reaching this conclusion,
thecourtfound thattheregulation
sgoalwasto preventcontributionsasa coverforwhatism uch likea bribe... intended toinduce
[an official]toexercisehisdiscretion in thedonor
sfavor.101
However, in Davis v. FEC, a latercasein which theSuprem e
Courtstruck down the Millionaire
s Am endm ent102 tothepublic financing portion of the Bipartisan Cam paign Reform Act
(BCRA), the petitioner successfully characterized the governm entaswrongfully requir[ing]a candidatetochoosebetween the
FirstAm endm entrightto engage in unfettered politicalspeech
and subjection to discrim inatory fundraising lim itations.103 Sim ilarly, RuleG-37 forcescovered associatesin them unicipalbond
m arketto choose between engaging in politicalspeech and subjecting them selves to extrem ely burdensom e regulations in the
norm alcourseofbusiness.
Waddell, supra note70.
Id.
99 See generally 61 F.3d 938, 942 (
D.C. Cir. 1995).
100 Id. at944.
101 Id. at942.
102 Bi
partisan Cam paign Reform Actof2002, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. §319(b)
(2002).
103 128 S. Ct
. 2759, 2771 (2008).
97
98

2016]

PRESUPPOSING CORRUPTION

219

2. SEC Rule 206(4)-5
The governm ent
s penalties for investm ent advisers covered
under Rule 206(4)-5 are hardly a better solution than the outrightban im posed by Rule G-37. These penalties which essentially force investm ent advisers accused of m aking otherwise
legalpoliticalcontributionstofulfilltheirfiduciary duty toa clientby providing laborforfree can beanalogized toan unlawful
regulatory taking. Governm enttakings lim itthe use ofprivate
propertytothepointthattheydeprivethelawfulownerofutility
or value,104 whereas Rule 206(4)-5 lim its the way in which a
private entity can engage in lawfulbusiness thatcreates such
value.105 Such lim its especially taking into accountthe am ount
ofincom e lost via foregone fees and carried interest have the
potentialto reduce the ultim ate value orutility ofthe business
itself. Furtherm ore, ifan investm entadviserweretobeharm ed
tothepointthatthebusinessisirreversibly dam aged, theregulation itselfm ight constitute not only a governm enttaking,106
butalsoan unduly negativem arketforce, asfaraspublicpolicy
isconcerned.
B. The Lawfulness of Influence
In lightofthe Court
s holding in Citizens United (even though
speakers m ay have influence over oraccesstoelected officials[,
that] does not m ean that those officials are corrupt107), Rules
G-37 and 206(4)-5 m ay be open to a strong First Am endm ent
challenge. Ifsuch a challengeweretoberaised, theCourtwould
need to determ ine whether the inducem entthatwas held unlawfulin Blount is sufficiently sim ilarto the influenceheld lawfulin Citizens United. Ifinducem entand influenceare indeed
thesam etypeand degreeofpressure, then thelineofreasoning
leadingtotheBlount holdingm ayprovenulland void.
104 John Mart
inez, Governm entTakings1 §1 (2014), available at Westlaw
NextRealPropertyTexts& Treatises.
105 17 C.F.R. §275.206(
4)-5 (2014).
106 See, e.g., Penn. CoalCo. v. Mahon, 43 S. Ct
. 158, 161 (1922)([O]ne fact
forconsideration in determ ining whetherthe lim itsofthe police powerhave
been exceeded istheextentoftheresulting dim inution in value.).
107 Ci
tizensUnited v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 314(2010).
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Atthe MSRB
squarterly m eeting in May2014, onlya m onth
after the Suprem e Courtruled in McCutcheon, thatregulatory
body
s chair appeared to recognize the changed standard for
corruption setforth by the Court, stating thatextending Rule
G-37 to m unicipal advisers would help prevent quid pro quo
political corruption, or the appearance of such corruption, in
public contracting.108 Subsequently, in Septem ber of2014, the
MSRB released draftam endm ents to Rule G-37 thatwould extend theRulein thism anner.109 Thus, itappearsthatregulators
are beginning to respond to courts by defending existing rules
againsta newer, stricter definition ofactualor im plied corruption. Thatsaid, itseem sunclearwhetherm erelystatingthatsuch
rulesareaim ed atpreventingquid proquocorruption isenough:
ifinfluenceisallthatsuch contributionsbuy, and influencedoes
notlead to quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof,
such statem entsm aym ean littlein thecourseofachallenge.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE PAY-TO-PLAY
CHALLENGES AND RULEMAKINGS
Alongwith theFirstAm endm entconcernsdescribed supra in
PartIII, state and federalpay-to-play lawsm ay face challenges
on severalotherfronts. First, individualsorentitiesseekingtodisputetheselawsm ayraiseconcernsthatcertain provisionsarethe
product of arbitrary and capricious rulem aking. Additionally,
certain laws notably those thatextend to the children and relativesofcovered associates, orallem ployeesofinvestm entadvisers with certain governm ent contracts could be struck down on
the basis thatthey are overbroad or duplicative ofother laws.
Also, due to the high stakes for those who violate pay-to-play
laws, rulem akingbodies(m ostnotably theSEC, which extended
108 Pr
essRelease, Mun. Sec. Rulem aking Bd., MSRB HoldsQuarterly Meeting (May 6, 2014), http://www.m srb.org/News-and-Events/Press-Releases/2014
/MSRB-Holds-Quarterly-Meeting-April-2014.aspx[http:
//
perm a.cc/
N9ZJ-BX7B].
109 MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO MSRB RULE G-37 TO EXTEND ITS PROVISIONS TO MUNICIPAL ADVISORS
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.m srb.org/~/m edia/Files/Regulatory-Notices/RFCs
/2014-15.ashx?n=1 [http://perm a.cc/R32W-SSAT][hereinafter G-37 Am endm entsRequestforCom m ent].
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com pliance deadlines and issued technical am endm ents after
enacting Rule 206(4)-5 due to widespread confusion am ong those
covered by the law 110)willneed to ensure thatthe language of
these rules is clearand precise in order to avoid challenges on
the basisofvagueness. Finally, the strictliability provisionsin
m any pay-to-play lawsm ay beg questionsaboutwhetherintent
should bea factorin both theenactm entand enforcem entofthese
laws. In otherwords, ifthereisquid, butnopossibilityofpro quo,
istherecorruption?
A. Arbitrariness and Capriciousness
Undergenerally accepted principlesofadm inistrative law, a
governm entagency
s rulem aking conducted underthe Adm inistrativeProcedureActisreviewed underthe arbitrary and capriciousstandard.111 Underthisstandard, courtsarecom pelled to
review an agency
s actions in order to determ ine whether the
agency undertook a reasonable effort to exam ine allpertinent
inform ation related totherulem aking and subsequently m adea
rationaldecision based on thefactsitfound.112 Agency decisions
arearbitraryand capriciousiftheagencyfailstousereasonable
diligencein itsfact-finding efforts, ifitfailstoconsiderrelevant
evidence, orifitbasesitsactionson conclusionsthata reasonableperson would notreach.113
TheSEC hasconceded thatRule206(4)-5 m ay, in thecourseof
its attem pts to prohibitunlawfulquid pro quo corruption, also
servetosuppressactivity thatisotherwiselawful.114 In a recent
challengetoRule206(4)-5 filed againsttheSEC by theNew York
and Tennessee state Republican parties, the plaintiffsnoted that
PoliticalContributionsby Certain Investm entAdvisers:Ban on ThirdParty Solicitation;Extension of Com pliance Date, 77 Fed. Reg. 35263-01
(June13, 2012)(tobecodified at17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
111 5 U.S.C. §706 (
2014).
112 Mot
or Vehicle Mfrs. Ass
n ofU.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
113 Id. at43.
114 Pol
iticalContributions by Certain Investm entAdvisors, 75 Fed. Reg.
41018, 41022 (July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) ([Rule
206(4)-5]thusperm itsthe Com m ission to adoptprophylacticrulesthatm ay
prohibitactsthatarenotthem selvesfraudulent.).
110
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this concession blatantly exceedsthe scope ofthatagency
s authority, stating in their com plaintthat[t]he SEC is prohibited
from using itsauthority to, 
by rulesand regulationsdefine... acts,
practices, and courses ofbusiness as are fraudulent, deceptive,
orm anipulativeto enactrulesthatprohibitconductbeyond that
which is fraudulent, deceptive, or m anipulative.115 Thus, in
prom ulgating Rule 206(4)-5, the SEC appeared to presuppose
thatallcam paign contributionsfrom covered associatesofinvestm entadvisorsareinherentlyfavor-seeking, andthereforesuspect.
Thisfaulty lineofreasoning can beanalogized tothescenario in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., a case in which the
Suprem eCourtapplied strictscrutinytoprovisionsoftheBCRA
thatprevented § 501(c)(4)organizationsfrom airing issue advocacy adswithin thirtydaysofan election.116 TheBCRA, likethe
SEC
s pay-to-play rule, sought to set a bright-line standard for
perm issiblepoliticalactivityfor§501(c)(4)nonprofitgroups, but
the Courtexplicitly rejected thisstandard asoverreaching, ruling that the desire for a bright-line rule ... hardly constitutes
the com pelling state interestnecessary to justify any infringem ent on First Am endm ent freedom .117 Furtherm ore, as the
Court stated, [w]here the FirstAm endm entis im plicated, the
tie goesto the speaker, notthe censor.118 In itsattem ptstosuppressunlawfulspeech, thegovernm entm aynotalsoinhibitlawfulspeech.119 As was initially the case with the FEC and the
BCRA, the SEC freely adm itted thatits regulations encom pass
lawful speech that is protected under the First Am endm ent.
Thisadm ission isarguablyrelevantinform ation thattheagency
failed totakeintoaccountduringitsrulem akingprocess.
115 Com pl
aintat16, N.Y. Republican StateCom m . v. SEC, 70 F. Supp. 3d
362 (D.D.C. 2014)(No. 14-01345)(quoting Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc.,
472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985));see infra note123.
116 551 U.S. 449, 464(
2007).
117 Id. at479 (
quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens forLife, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986)).
118 Id. at474.
119 
The Governm ent m ay not suppress lawful speech as the m eans to
suppressunlawfulspeech. Protected speech doesnotbecom eunprotected m erely
because it resem bles the latter. The Constitution requires the reverse.
Ashcroftv. FreeSpeech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
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Additionally, the de m inim is contribution lim its setby both
Rule G-37120 and Rule 206(4)-5,121 as wellas m any other state
pay-to-play laws, do notseem to be based on evidence illustrating whytheseam ounts, ratherthan thebasecontribution lim its
im posed on allotherindividualsand PACsby the FECA,122 are
sufficienttopreventpay-to-play activity. NeithertheMSRB nor
the SEC hasprovided guidance on whetherorwhy these lower
am ounts are set correctly. As U.S. District CourtJudge Beryl
Howellsaid during an adjudication hearing in N.Y. Republican
State Comm. v. SEC:[t]he$350 [dem inim islim itin Rule206(4)-5]
seem s like itcam e outofthin air.123 Thus, according totheappropriate standard of review, which fails if the rulem aking
agency doesnotm eetjustone ofthe criteria, the SEC
srulem akingcould beconsidered arbitraryand capricious.
In lateAugustof2015, theD.C. Circuitupheldthe60-daystatutory review provision ofthe Investm entAdvisers Act and, by
extension, the SEC
s pay-to-play rule in New York Republican
State Committee v. SEC, holding thatthisdeadlinewasnotsubjectto equitable tolling.124 However, the courtacknowledged that
upon presentation ofan as-applied challenge (asopposed to the
facialchallenge in the case atbar), a districtcourtcould have
MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-37:POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL SECURITIES BUSINESS, http://www.m srb.org
/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx [http://perm a
.cc/3NK6-MUV9](setting a de m inim is lim itof$250 percandidate perelection iftheindividualcontributingisentitled tovoteforthatofficial).
121 17 C.F.R. §275.206(
4)-5(b)(1)(2014)(settingadem inim islim itof$350 per
election toofficialsorcandidatesforwhom an individualisentitled tovote, and
$150 perelection to officials orcandidate forwhom an individualis notentitled tovote).
122 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS CHART 2013
2014, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblim its.shtm l[http://perm a.cc
/XQF2-NPUL](Individuals and PACs m ay give $2,600 to each candidate or
candidate com m ittee perelection, $32,400 to each nationalparty com m ittee
percalendaryear, and a com bined $10,000 to state, district, and localparty
com m itteespercalendaryear.).
123 Josh Gerst
ein, Judge Mulls SEC Limits on Political Donations, POLITICO
(Sept. 12, 2014, 6:29 PM), http://www.politico.com /blogs/under-the-radar/2014
/09/judge-m ulls-sec-lim its-on-political-donations-195402.htm l[http://perm a.cc
/AWG5-B3SS].
124 799 F.3d 1126, 113435 (
D.C. Cir. 2015).
120
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jurisdiction toreview theruleundertheConstitution and/orthe
Adm inistrativeProcedureAct.125
Therefore, theconstitutionalconcernsposed bytheplaintiffs,
as wellas the question ofwhethera particularpay-to-play rulem aking isarbitrary and capricious, rem ain liveissuesforfuture
courtstoconsiderin thecontextofconcreteclaim s. In addition, it
ispossible thatthe plaintiffsin thiscase willpetition the United
StatesSuprem eCourtforawritofcertiorariinthecom ingm onths.
B. Overbroadness and Inadequate Evidence
With regard topay-to-playrestrictionsin certain jurisdictions,
evidenceexiststhatcorruption occurred in thepast. Notably, in
Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, theSecond Circuitupheld
Connecticut
s pay-to-play ban barring statecontractorsfrom contributingtothecam paignsofstatecandidates, stating:
[B]ecause the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut
created the appearance of corruption with respect to all exchanges ofm oney between state contractors and candidates
for state office ... [the] outright ban on contractor contributions was justified (i.e., closely drawn to m eet the state
s
anticorruption interest) because even a severe lim it on contractorcontributionswould allow a sm allflow ofcontributions
between contractors and candidates and would, as a result,
likelygiverisetoan appearanceofcorruption.126

SEC Rule206(4)-5 alsoaroseoutoftheashesofscandal:in the
early 2000s, New York State com ptrollerAlan Hevesiwas convictedofacceptingbribesin exchangeforinvestm entsin hisstate
s
127
pension fund. In Blount v. SEC, the MSRB and SEC successfullydefended RuleG-37 againstaFirstAm endm entchallengeby
providing extensivedocum entation ofpay-to-play practicesam ong
investm ent, securities, and m unicipalfinanceentities.128
Previoussuccessfulchallengestolawsbanning contributions
by a specific class seized on the governm ent
s inability to show
Id. at1136.
616 F.3d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 2010).
127 Marc Li
fsher, New York State Pension Fund Trustee Pleads Guilty to
Taking Bribes, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010), http://articles.latim es.com /2010/oct
/07/business/la-fi-hevesi-20101007 [http://perm a.cc/Z6ZB-9WHN].
128 See generally 61 F.3d 938, 939 (
1995).
125
126
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thatcertain provisionsofthose lawsprevented corruption, thus
proving thatthelaw wasoverbroad. Forexam ple, in McConnell
v. FEC, the Suprem e Courtoverturned the BCRA
s ban on politicalcontributionsfrom m inors, holdingthatthegovernm entfailed
toassertam pleevidenceofcorruption via conduit;thatis, parents
donating in theirchildren
snam esin ordertocircum ventcontribution lim its.129 This holding could lend supportto a challenge
ofConnecticut
sorNew Jersey
spay-to-play laws(absenta track
record in those states ofparents contributing in their children
s
nam es), both ofwhich prohibit dependent children ofcovered
associatesfrom m akingpoliticalcontributions.130
C. Duplicative Laws
Many pay-to-play laws prohibitcontributions notonly from
individualswhoaredirectly involved in thecontracting process,
butalsofrom theirfam ilym em bersandwork colleagues.131 Fam ily
m em ber contribution restrictions existin order to preventcontractorsfrom funnelingm oneytogovernm entofficialsin thenam e
oftheirspouseorchildren, butlawsthatprohibitthispossibility
are already on the books:federalelection law currently enjoins
any person from m aking a politicalcontribution in the nam e of
anotherperson, orfrom knowingly perm itting theirnam e to be
usedtoaffectacontribution byanotherperson.132
In Citizens United, the Suprem e Courtnoted the duplicative
natureoflawsthatprohibitcertain contributions,133 anditisquite
possiblethatthepresenceofanti-briberyand anti-fraud lawsm ay
lead courtstoconcludethatfurtherrestrictionsareunnecessary.
Notably, in McConnell, the Court held that the governm ent
s
failure to produce adequate evidence ofparents contributing in
540 U.S. 93, 232 (2003)([T]he Governm entoffers scantevidence ofthis
form ofevasion.).
130 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-612(
e)(1) (West 2014);N.J. STAT. ANN.
19:44A-20.6 (West2014).
131 See K Y. REV. STAT . ANN. § 121.330(
3)(4)(West2014)(relating to prohibitionson politicalcontributionsfrom im m ediatefam ily m em bers);V T. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §109(a)(West2014)(relatingtoprohibitionson contributionsfrom
em ployeeswith responsibilitytoprovideinvestm entservicesofanykind).
132 52 U.S.C. §30122 (
2015).
133 Ci
tizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (The practices
Buckleynoted would becovered by bribery laws.).
129
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thenam esoftheirchildren likely stem m ed from thefactthatthe
FECA already prohibited individualsfrom m aking politicalcontributionsin the nam e ofanother, rendering the restrictionson
m inorscontributionsredundant.134
Additionally, som e pay-to-play laws contribution bans include allofficersofa com pany with businessbefore the governm ent, regardlessofwhetherthose individualsplay a role in the
procurem entprocess. For exam ple, under New Jersey
s pay-toplaylaw, itispossiblethatan officerworkinghalfwayacrossthe
country in an unrelated division ofa com pany thatengages in
governm entprocurem entcould be prohibited from m aking certain politicalcontributions.135 Such restrictionsappearto be on
shaky ground in lightofholdings, such as thatin Dallman v.
Ritter, which view blanketprohibitions on contributions skepticallyabsentdirectevidenceofcorruption orthelikelihood thereof,
rather than pure presupposition.136 Furtherm ore, the Suprem e
Court
s stipulation that courts should respect the doctrine of
m ore speech, notless,137 especially in caseswherean individual
hasvirtually no controloverthe contracting process, could lead
to increased scrutiny regarding whether these restrictions are
closely drawn to serve an anti-corruption purpose. Because itis
alreadyillegalunderfederallaw tom akea politicalcontribution
in the nam e ofanother, courts m ay look skeptically upon laws
thatsim plyduplicatewhatisalreadyon thebooks.138
Com m enters on FINRA
s proposed pay-to-play rule (described
supra in PartII, Section A)havealsoexpressed concern aboutthe
rule
s disgorgem ent provision.139 Presently, neitherRule 206(4)-5
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232, 245 (Perhaps the Governm ent
s slim evidenceresultsfrom sufficientdeterrence ofsuch activitiesby §320 ofFECA.).
135 N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:
44A-20.6 (When a businessentity is otherthan a
naturalperson, a contribution by any person orotherbusinessentity having
an interest therein shallbe deem ed to be a contribution by the business
entity.).
136 See, e.g., 225 P.3d 610, 623 (
Colo. 2010).
137 See, e.g., Ashcrof
t v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 259 (2002)
(Thom as, J., concurring)(The Governm entm ay notsuppress lawfulspeech
asthem eansto suppressunlawfulspeech.).
138 See supra t
extaccom panying notes13132.
139 SIFMA, R E:FINRA REGULATORY NOTICE 14-50 11 (
Dec. 22, 2014),
http://www.sifm a.org/com m ent-letters/2014/sifm a-subm its-com m ents-to-finra-on
-regulatory-notice-14-50-relating-to-pay-to-play-practices/ [http://perm a.cc/J2ZT
-DYXV].
134
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norRuleG-37 m andatesdisgorgem ent, and investm entadvisers
who discover potentialpay-to-play violations typically disgorge
any paym ents received under the problem atic arrangem entin
question on a voluntary basis.140 By m andating disgorgem ent,
som epractitionershave speculated thatFINRA
srule could pose
an undue penalty forinvestm entadvisers who have already internally discovered and rectified pay-to-play problem s in good
faith.141 This could effectively deter such firm s from voluntary
disgorgem ent.142 Other practitioners, however, have expressed
doubtthatthe disgorgem entprovision would affectinvestm ent
adviserswillingnessto self-rectify potentialviolations, as regulating entities tends to refrain from further enforcem ent action
againstpotentialviolators once they disgorge allfees in question.143 However, these sam e practitioners acknowledge that
disgorgem enthasthepotentialtobea heavy and disproportionatepenalty, especially in situationswherean investm entadviser
doesnotknowinglyviolateapay-to-playlaw.144
D. Void for Vagueness Problems
Anotherpotentialissueforfuturelitigation involvesdefining
whofallsundertheaegisofpay-to-playlawswithoutover-covering
orleaving room forloopholes. SEC Rule206(4)-5 hasdrawn criticism forwhatm anyperceiveasan inadequatedefinition ofwhat
constitutes a covered associate under that law.145 A covered
associateofan investm entadviserisdefined asanygeneralpartner, m anaging m em ber or executive officer, or other individual

140 INV. CO. INST., RE:FINRA NOTICE 14-50 RELATING TO PROPOSED 
PAYTO-PLAY RULES 5 (
Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files

/notice_com m ent_file_ref/p602179_0.pdf[http://perm a.cc/VUU8-J2DJ].
141 SIFMA, supra not
e139, at11.
142 INV. CO. INST., supra not
e140, at5.
143 Tel
ephone Interview with Kenneth Gross & Patricia Zweibel, supra
note41.
144 Id.
145 Waddel
l, supra note 70 (The SEC received nearly 800 com m entletters
stating thatthe Rulewas
toobroadin defining who isa m unicipaladvisor).
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with a sim ilarstatusorfunction;anyem ployeewhosolicitsa governm ententity forthe investm entadviserand any person who
supervises, directly orindirectly, such em ployee;and any politicalaction com m ittee controlled by the investm entadviserorby
any of its covered associates.146 Practitioners of political law
haveexpressed confusion overwhetherthisonlycoversthosewho
solicitm unicipalitiestoinvest with theadviser, orifitalsocovers
thosewhosolicitm unicipalitiestobecome clients oftheadviser.147
Although both involve a business relationship, the potentialrewards from investm ent m anagem ent fees and carried interest
arefargreaterthan m onthlyretainerfees.
Initially, the SEC stated thatitwould notadopta proposed
am endm entto the definition ofcovered associate,which replaced
theword individualwith theword personsothata legalentity,
not just an actualperson em ployed by the adviser, would be
considered a covered associate.148 However, the finalrule m istakenlyreflected theproposed change:the word individualwas
replaced incorrectly by the word person,and the SEC was forced
to m ake a technicalam endm entto theRule forclarity
ssake.149
Proposed am endm entsto Rule G-37 also have led to concerns
overdefinitionalvagueness. Although the am endm entsattem pt
to clarify which governm ent entities are encom passed by the
regulation by replacing the term officialofan issuerwith officialofa m unicipalentity,150 theyalsocoverincum bentsand candidatesforelective office ... directly orindirectly responsible for,
or[who]can influencethe hiring ofa covered m unicipalsecuritiesbrokerordealer.151 The Rule doesnotaddresswhatconstitutes indirect influence or responsibility, nor does it provide
titles or articulated standards (beyond this vague definition)
17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-5(f)(2)(2014).
Waddell, supra note70.
148 Techni
calAm endm enttoRule206(4)-5:PoliticalContributionsByCertain Investm entAdvisers, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,476 (May 15, 2012)(to be codified
at17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
149 SEC Makes Technical Amendment to Definition of Covered Associates
Under Pay to Play Rule of the Advisers Act, BRACEWELL & GUILIANI (June7,
2012),
http:/
/www.bracewellgiuliani.com /
news-publications/
updates/sec-m akes
-technical-am endm ent-definition-covered-associates-under-pay-play [http:
//
perm a
.cc/H83R-UKWE].
150 See G-37 Am endm ent
sRequestforCom m ent, supra note109.
151 Id.
146
147
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concerning specificcovered officials.152 Ifinvestm entadvisers are
not reasonably able to determ ine what practices the Rule requires and forbids, the proposed am endm ents could potentially
be held void for vagueness on the theory thatthey violate the
DueProcessClause.153 FortheRuletowithstand a challengeon
this basis, the MSRB and other regulators willneed to ensure
thatsuch definitionsareclearlystated from theoutset.
E. Strict Liability Issues
Finally, itis possible thatSEC Rule 206(4)-5
s strictliability
provision m ay com e underattack in future litigation. Indeed, if
theaim ofsuch lawsistopreventcorruption, how should courts
approach situations in which an investm ent adviser m akes a
contribution thatcannotpossibly undulyinfluencethecontracting
process?Politicallaw practitioners have noted thatthese strict
liabilityprovisionscouldseverelypenalizecoveredindividualswho
do notm ake the conscious decision to violate pay-to-play laws,
butratherinadvertently violate them by giving a politicalcontribution to, forexam ple, a form ercollegeroom m ateorfriend who
isrunningforoffice.154
In atleastonecase, theSEC hasinterpreted itsown pay-toplay law in the broadestpossible m anner, directly violating the
tailoring requirem ents for politicalcontribution restrictions set
forth by theSuprem eCourt.155 In 2014, theSEC broughtaction
againstan investm entadviserthatm adecontributionstoofficials
em ployed by a governm entissuer.156 However, the issuer itself
was already invested in and com m itted to the fund, the fund
itselfwasin wind-downm ode, and thegovernm entdid notallege
thatthe investm entadviser soughtto m arketadditionalfunds
within two years ofthe contributions in question.157 Therefore,
the contributions did nothave an im propereffecton the issuer
See, e.g., G-37 Am endm entsRequestforCom m ent, supra note109.
See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)([a law]isunconstitutionally vague [if]itsubjectsthe exercise ofthe rightofassem bly to
an unascertainablestandard).
154 Tel
ephone Interview with Kenneth Gross & Patricia Zweibel, supra
note41.
155 Tel
ephoneInterview with Stefan Passantino, supra note42.
156 See generally TL Vent
ures, Inc., 3859 S.E.C. 3-15940 (2014).
157 Id.
152
153
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becausetherewerenoinvestm entdecisionsthattheissuercould
havem adebeyond thatpointin tim e. Thisnullified theidea that
corruption couldpossiblyhaveoccurred.
The FEC, foritspart, firsttouched on the issue ofstrictliabilityforfederalcontractorsm akingcontributionsrelated tofederalelections(in violation oftheFECA)in a 2011 MatterUnder
Review (MUR), or agency enforcem ent action.158 According to
theMUR, severalAlaskacorporations, which thegovernm entalleged tobefederalcontractors, m adecontributionstoan independentexpenditure-only com m itteesupporting incum bentSenator
Lisa Murkowskiduring the 2010 election cycle.159 Ultim ately,
theFEC determ ined that, although thecorporationsappeared to
befederalcontractorsand did in factengagein governm entcontracting, they were unaware of the governm ent lease arrangem entsthatgavethem federalcontractorstatus.160 Furtherm ore,
the m oney paid by the federalgovernm entto these corporations
was relatively sm all161 and appeared to prim arily benefitthe
publicinterest.162 Finally, theindependentexpenditure-onlycom m itteeitselfwasnotfound tohave coordinated with Murkowski
s
cam paign.163 In the end, forthese reasons, the FEC chosetoexerciseitsprosecutorialdiscretion and dism issthe chargesagainst
the corporationsaccused ofim properactivity underthe FECA.164
Thus, atthe agency level, the FEC
s m ore discretionary enforcem entofitsown rulesrelating totheprevention ofcorruption lies
in contrasttotheSEC
sstrictliability approach.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE ELECTIONS
Pay-to-play laws have the potentialto affectboth state and
federalelections, includingpresidentialelectionsin which oneor
m ore candidates is a covered state official. Indeed, New Jersey
FEC MUR 6403 (AlaskansStandingTogether), Com plaint(2011).
Id.
160 FEC MUR 6403 (
AlaskansStandingTogether), Certification (2011).
161 Weekly Digest: Week of November 28 to December 2, FEC (
Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.fec.gov/press/
press2011/20111202digest.shtm l [http://perm a.cc/577B
-UDN8].
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See FEC MUR 6403, Cert
ification, supra note160.
158
159
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governorChrisChristie, a 2016 presidentialcandidate, hasfaced
accusations thata board m em berofthe financialservices firm
Prudentialplctraded contributionsfora$300 m illion New Jersey
state pension m anagem entcontract.165 Such presidentialcandidatesm ay also face potentiallegalconflictswhen they exitthe
prim aryand return toofficein theirhom estate.166
Atthecongressionallevel, pay-to-playlawsarevery likely to
have an im pacton House and Senate races:congressionalcandidatesare often drawn from the ranksofthe state legislature,
and these lawscould stifle the ability ofcandidates to com pete
for federaloffice ifthey are sitting legislators in a state with
strictpay-to-play laws.167 Atthe presidentiallevel, in the past,
potentialcandidates have responded to the possibility ofbeing
affected by pay-to-play laws by notrunning atall,168 or by not
selectingacovered stateofficialasarunningm ate.169
Thatsaid, even candidates who resign from a covered state
position and are legally qualified to receive contributions from
individuals and PACs connected with investm entadvisers m ay
face an uphill battle in garnering contributions. Because the
penalties for violating pay-to-play laws are severe, risk-averse
covered advisersm aychooseinstead tositon thesidelineswhen
David Sirota, Matthew Cunningham -Cook & Andrew Perez, Chris
Christie Officials Sent Pension Money to Subsidiary of Donors Foreign Firm,
INT
L BUS. TIMES (
Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.ibtim es.com /chris-christie
-officials-sent-pension-m oney-subsidiary-donors-foreign-firm -1847744 [http://
perm a.cc/JJE8-26H5].
166 Duri
ng the 2016 presidentialelection cycle, these candidatesincluded
Christie, Wisconsin GovernorScottWalker, OhioGovernorJohn Kasich, and
Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal. Heather Haddon & Rebecca Ballhaus,
State Contractors Aid Governors Campaigns, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com /articles/state-contractors-aid-governors-cam paigns-144054
7616 [http://perm a.cc/L2KB-JTDZ].
167 Tel
ephone Interview with Kenneth Gross & Patricia Zweibel, supra
note41.
168 Tel
ephoneInterview with Stefan Passantino, supra note42.
169 Pundi
ts suspect that New Jersey
s strict pay-to-play laws m ay have
been a factor in Mitt Rom ney
s decision not to select New Jersey governor
Chris Christie as his pick for Vice President. See, e.g., Lois Rom ano, Balz
book: Christie considered 2012, POLITICO (July 2, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www
.politico.com /story/2013/07/dan-balz-book-chris-christie-2012-93663.htm l [http:
//
perm a.cc/H35U-KN2L](referring to a book by Washington PostchiefcorrespondentDan Balzrecountingthe2012 Presidentialcam paign).
165
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a stateofficialrunsforfederaloffice.170 Thiseffectively putsthose
candidates(such asform erstategovernors)ata com petitivedisadvantage with relation to other candidates (such as Senators
andCongressm en).171 Given thefactthatstategovernorshipsarea
com m on springboard forthe Presidency,172 aswellasthe sheer
am ountoffundsneeded torun a successfulcam paign, thiscould
have trem endous im plications on who chooses to run forPresident, aswellaswhich candidatesultim atelywin thefundraising
war and perhapsthe nation
shighestoffice.
Anotherkey m atterthatfuture courtsm ay addressinvolves
whether federalcontractors m ay give to independent expenditure-only com m ittees, orSuperPACs. Such PACshave already
proven tobetrem endouslyinfluentialin the2016 election cycle,173
and willlikely continue to hold a greatdealofsway in federal
electionsforthe foreseeable future. Thisissue hasnotyetbeen
litigated:notably, theplaintiffsin Wagner v. FEC (discussedsupra
in PartI, Section C)explicitly lim ited thescopeoftheirclaim to
excludeSuperPACs.174
TheFEC, foritspart, hasdeclinedtofindreason tobelievethat
a contribution toa superPAC from an entityalleged tohaveties
toa governm entcontractorwould constitutea violation offederal
election laws. In a bipartisan vote on a MUR in 2014, the FEC
dism issed charges alleging that Chevron Corporation violated
thefederalcontractorcontribution ban by contributing toan independentexpenditure-only com m ittee.175 According tothefacts
ofthe enforcem entm atter, Chevron USA, a wholly owned subsidiary ofChevron Corporation (which m ade the contribution),
owned a subsidiary thatowned anothersubsidiarythatowned a
Wary investm entadviserswith nodesiretotestopaquepay-to-play laws
m ay usetheselawsasan excusenottogivetocertain cam paigns, even ifthe
contribution iscom pletelylegal. TelephoneInterview with Stefan Passantino,
supra note42.
171 Carri
e Dann, Competitive Disadvantage?: Pay-to-Play Rules and the
2016 Stakes, NBC (Jan. 15, 2015, 1:36 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com /politics
/
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federalcontractor.176 In so voting, the FEC appeared to concede
thatifa parentcom pany thatm akes independentexpenditures
receivessufficientfunds from sourcesotherthan its federalcontractorsubsidiary, such expendituresareperm issible.177 Moreover,
in Novem berof2015, theFEC deadlocked on whethertopursue
apetition forrulem akingthatwould preventsubsidiariesofgovernm ent contractors from contributing to super PACs.178 Cam paign financeexpertshaveflagged the outcom eofMUR 6276, as
wellas the failed rulem aking petition, as highlighting the doctrinalfragilityofthefederalcontractorban in certain cases.179
CONCLUSION
The Suprem e Court
s decisions in Citizens United and
McCutcheon shifted thestandard by which alleged corruption in
politicsism easured. Based on thisjurisprudence, itappearsthat
the Courtwillcontinue to lim itthe definition ofcorruption to
actsthatinvolve, orappearto involve, a quid proquo exchange
ofcontributionsin exchangeforofficialactsorprom ises, atleast
forthepurposesofcam paign financelawsand regulations. Furtherm ore, access to or influence upon governm ent officials or
candidatesresulting from contributionsorexpendituresdoesnot
atleastasfarastheCourtisconcerned constitutecorruption.180
Currentpractitionersofpoliticallaw haveacknowledged that
theholding in McCutcheon hasraised thebar, asfarasregulating politicalcorruption isconcerned.181 When thatbarisraised,
thequestion ariseswhethera penalty(such astheoneim posed by
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Rule206(4)-5)ratherthan a sim pleban (such astheoneim posed
by Rule G-37) is an undue restriction of investm ent advisers
FirstAm endm entrights.182 Indeed, when RuleG-37 wasprom ulgated, regulatorswereallegedly carefultogiveinvestm entadviserstheoption ofdoingcontractbusinessorm akingcontributions,
rather than sim ply im posing a penalty that could overburden
theirFirstAm endm entrights.183
Thus far, the Court
s jurisprudence has not specifically addressed Rule206(4)-5, and theunderpinningsofitsearlieropinion
upholding Rule G-37 have shifted as well. If the Court does
eventually address these laws, the sam e constitutionaland adm inistrativeprinciplesprotecting politicalspeech, expenditures,
and contributions m ay apply to pay-to-play laws, given their
intertwinem entwith cam paign finance laws. In the end, ifcourts
choose to apply the sam e FirstAm endm entanalysis to pay-toplay lawsasthey do to cam paign finance lawsand regulations,
thecom pellingstateinterestbehind thepay-to-play legalfram ework thatis, the presupposition ofcorruption m ay wellcom e
intoquestion in thenearfuture.
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